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The contents of this paper were drafted from a workgroup report to an 
Engineering Foundation Conference entitled "Financing and Amortizing Water 
Resources Infrastructure" held at Palm Coast, Florida, March 29-April 3, 1987. 
A slightly different version of this paper will appear in the forthcoming 
conference proceedings. 
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Water resource development often has been undertaken with a zeal unique in 
both ambition and accomplishment. The taming and settlement of the American 
West is largely a function of water resource projects providing irrigation as well 
as municipal water in an arid and semi-arid landscape. Rivers, harbors and flood 
control projects were equally impressive in scale and financial commitment. 
These monuments to U.S. engineering expertise generated a great deal of national 
pride and development stimulus. While the rate at which federal projects come 
on line has decreased in recent years, portions of the U.S. water resource 
inventory remain heavily capitalized. 
At the same time, the professional community as well as the popular press 
recently have focused attention on the other side of the infrastructure picture. 
Water delivery systems in many of the nation's older cities are seriously outdated 
with corroding pipes and inadequate treatment facilities. It is estimated that New 
York City's leakage loss amounts to 9 percent.1 Nationally, the cost to upgrade 
water delivery systems is estimated by various sources to be between $3.7 and 
2$7.6 billion per year. While significant progress has been made over the past 
two decades in expanding and upgrading sewerage treatment facilities, EPA 
estimates that it will require $76.2 billion to meet Clean Water standards by the 
year 2005.3 
The paradox of water resource infrastructure in the U.S. is that at the same 
time that a significant overcapitalization of facilities appears to exist in some 
areas a significant undercapitalization of facilities and maintenance exists in still 
other areas. This disequilibrium suggests that capital markets with respect to 
water resources are not functioning well. 
How did capital markets with respect to water resource inventory become so 
distorted, and what can be done about this situation? This paper will try to 
answer these questions. The first section provides an historical perspective on 
the institutional structure that has evolved to develop and administer water 
resource infrastructure in the U.S. With this background, the present 
predicament is examined to better understand the nature of the problem and its 
implications for U.S. water policy. Finally, policy options are considered and 
recommendations made to address this predicament. 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
To better understand the present predicament with respect to water resource 
infrastructure, it is important to examine the historical context and institutional 
framework in which water resource policies have evolved. Principal actors in 
terms of water resource development include federal, state, and local govern­
ment and private water companies. 
Federal Role 
The federal role with respect to water resource development began with the 
establishment of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1794. From its original 
missions to construct and maintain coastal fortifications and to promote inland 
navigation, the civilian component of the Corps eventually became more active 
than the military projects group. 
Additional impetus for federal involvement grew out of the westward 
expansion of the late nineteenth century. The Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the 
Carey Act of 1894 offered low priced land to settlers that irrigated their land. By 
the turn of the century, the best, most easily irrigated lands had been claimed. 
Further development meant larger investments in resevoirs, dams, and diversion 
canals. Private irrigation companies were becoming financially strapped in 
trying to expand irrigation potential, and many had become bankrupt in the 
process (Frederick, 1986). 
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provided an entree for the formal involvement 
of the federal government in "planning, constructing, operating, and maintaining 
facilities to store, regulate, and divert water for reclaiming the country's water 
short areas." An important policy initiative of the Theodore Roosevelt 
Presidency, the legislation created the Reclamation Service, later renamed the 
Bureau of Reclamation. With this new responsibility, the federal government 
embarked on a new era in U.S. water policy. 
The mission of reclaiming the semi-arid west led to massive construction 
projects, a restructuring of economic opportunity, and political intrigue affecting 
project location and scale. Among the more noteworthy accomplishments of the 
early years was the construction of Hoover Dam on the Lower Colorado River 
completed in 1936. The project which took five years to complete and stood 726 
feet tall was by far the largest construction project ever attempted. Principal 
beneficiaries of the project included the City of Los Angeles and the Imperial 
Valley. 
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The next great champion of federal water projects was another Roosevelt. 
Now, however, federal public works included the additional justification of 
economic stimulus during the depths of the Depression. Federal projects along 
the Columbia River dwarfed Hoover Dam in scale. The largest of these dams, the 
Grand Coulee, was twice the size of Hoover Dam. When planned in 1930, Grand 
Coulee was to generate ten times the electricity demanded of the entire Pacific 
Northwest. At full operation, the system generated 2.1 million kilowatts of 
electricity making it the single largest source of electricity in the world. This 
energy glut was closed considerably by the Second World War and the location of 
much of the U.S. aluminum and aircraft industry in the region. This tapped 
energy potential and consequent industrial capacity, it is speculated, may have 
been the single most important factor affecting the outcome of the war 
(Reisner, 1986). 
Development of the Upper Colorado River in the 1950's brought in the 
concept of River Basin Management to appropriate cumulative benefits within a 
river basin to justify still further irrigation benefits for Bureau projects. The 
Corps was active as well. Since flood control benefits were not subject to cost 
recovery, additional projects were justified. Competition between the two 
agencies culminated in the Pick-Sloan Project along the Missouri River. 
In real dollar terms, federal outlays for construction projects peaked in 
1965 at 3.7 billion dollars (1982=100). Real annual expenditures have 
continued to decline during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. Real operation 
and maintenance expenditures have continued to increase, doubling since the tate 
1 9 5 0 's (North, 1 9 8 7) . 
While water resource development efforts stabilized or in some cases 
declined, pollution control programs grew to more than fill this void. With the 
Environmental Protection Act and the Clean Water Act of 1972 and its 
amendments, federal expenditures for water quality increased more than tenfold 
between 1970 and 1977. Since 1973, water pollution programs have supplanted 
water resource development programs as the principal natural resource 
expenditure category. 
Both water resource development and pollution control programs have been 
affected by the political philosophy of the Reagan Administration. In nominal 
terms, net outlays for natural resource programs peaked in 1980. Water 
resource development projects are likely to entail greater local cost sharing as 
mandated in the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 (PL99-662}. In 
3 
terms of pollution control, the Clean Water Act of 1987 established guidelines and 
funding for the establishment of state revolving funds to transfer greater 
responsibility to state government. 
State Role 
State water law provides the rubiric in which water allocation decisions are 
made. Yet, in terms of water resource finance, states traditionally have played an 
intermediary role interfacing between federal initiatives and local water 
providers. With a changing federal posture with respect to water policy, state 
government is likely to experience the most drastic role reversal among 
governmental units with regard to water resource policy and finance. 
States of the eastern seaboard actively pursued inland navigation projects in 
the early nineteenth century in an attempt to open western territories to their 
ports. With the notable exception of the Erie Canal, most of these projects failed 
to generate expected trade at significant cost expenditures. That experience led 
many eastern states to shy away from water development activities. In the next 
century, western states would take the initiative in terms of water development, 
the most notable case being the Central Valley Project in California in the 1960's. 
Even in that case, state bond issue of $1. 75 billion dollars in 1960 provided 
only half the promised water, and the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of 
Reclamation were called in to develop eight additional sites to meet projected 
deficits. 
Beyond legal basis and occasional development activities, state water policy 
has evolved in two major time frames. In the early part of this century, public 
health concerns precipitated the formation of public health departments with 
water quality among the areas of focus. The second major thrust came in the 
1960's with the formation of the Water Resources Council at the federal level. 
States were provided funding to develop a water planning framework. Out of this 
initiative, most states either have developed or are developing comprehensive 
water plans. 
Still, in terms of relative importance, the New Federalism as evidenced in 
the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 and the Clean Water Act of 1987 
may have far greater effects on the responsibility of states with respect to water 
finance than these earlier initiatives. Increased cost sharing by state and local 
participants in federal projects and state administration of revolving funds for 
waste treatment facilities will result. At the same time, separate infrastructure 
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funds are being established at the state level for water and sewer construction and 
renovation. 
Local Role 
Local government has played a primary role as provider of water. Some 
100,000 entities including municipalities, counties, and public service districts 
operate in the U.S. delivering three-fourths of domestic water supply. Financing 
at the local level incorporates a complex set of instruments including water and 
sewer receipts, local tax allocations, and elements from other institutional 
• 
sources, such as federal and state grants and loans and private sector investment. 
In general, water delivery systems have been self-sufficient and/or 
revenue-generating. Nevertheless, many public systems are inefficiently run 
and replacement funds are typically underfunded or nonexistent. Low interest 
Farmers Home Administration loans have been a principal source of capital for 
many small systems. A demise of this program will place hardships on many 
small systems unless an alternative funding mechanism is forthcoming. 
Of far greater concern to local government is the future of federal support 
for waste treatment programs. EPA, EDA, and HUD programs have been the source 
of significant support over the past twenty years. A restructuring and/or 
elimination of these programs, as envisioned at this time, will have important 
implications on the way that local water systems operate in the future. Complete 
self-sufficiency, in terms of both water delivery and waste treatment, may force 
higher water rates and a significant adjustment process particularly for small 
rural systems. 
Private Role 
Of the nation's community water supply systems, 22 percent (some 33,000 
systems) are privately or investor owned representing a rare case of defacto and 
long-standing private sector involvement. In the process, interrelationships 
with other institutional elements have been established including rate regulation 
at the state level and quality standards at the federal level. 
A great deal of attention has been given in recent years to privatization as an 
alternative to public service provision. Among the options available are the 
outright sale of government assets (like Conrail and water and sewer systems} to 
more partnership-type schemes (like contracting out, sale-leaseback, and 
development fees or contributions in aid of construction.) Despite its recent 
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popularity in some libertarian circles, not all publicly provided goods and 
services are equally amenable to privatization. Although water delivery is easily 
subject to efficiency tests, local governments may be, for that reason, less likely 
to return this responsibility once already established. 
Private capital markets may have a great deal to say about financial 
arrangements particularly with respect to waste treatment facilities. Yet, recent 
changes in federal tax law may alter dramatically the landscape of privatization 
endeavors, as well as other private investment options. The institutional 
framework, especially elements related to the private sector, is, thus, in a 
transitional state with a great deal of fluidity at this time. 
PROBLEMS AND CAUSES 
As noted earlier, the principal problem in terms of water resource 
infrastructure appears to be a disequilibrium in capital markets. The section that 
follows examines the present predicament with respect to water resource 
infrastructure focusing in particular on this overinvestment/u nderinvestment 
paradox. 
Overinvestment in Facilities 
Water development activities often have been characterized by overkill, a 
problem not unique in the U.S. but prevalent worldwide as well. A part of the 
problem can be attributed to monument building or over-engineering to 
compensate for the shortcomings of natural processes. There is no doubt that 
these factors are important determinants in the scale of operations for water 
development projer.ts. How is it that a little overzealousness has gotten out of 
hand? 
Consistent with this structural bias in meeting water needs, specifications 
have often favored high-cost, high-technology solutions. The result often has 
been goldplated capital facilities. Some of the engineering marvels of the world 
have been built in this way. Yet, construction costs have been high, as have 
operation, maintenance, and repair costs (OM&R). 
Another factor that has had significant influence on the level of 
overinvestment in facilities particularly at the federal level has been the 
authorization of multiple purpose projects. It seems only logical that projects 
providing multiple benefits be evaluated on a multiple purpose basis. Yet, the end 
result of this accounting precept was to allow considerably more latitude in the 
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justification of projects. Independently, irrigation benefits were often 
overestimated particularly in light of nationwide surpluses in specific 
agricultural commodities, and estimates of hydroelectric benefits ignored, at 
times, supply and demand conditions in the service region. Collectively, pooled 
benefit streams made project justification more likely. 
The advent of river basin planning allows still further leeway in project 
appraisal, as otherwise infeasible projects were combined for evaluation 
purposes with high benefit producing projects within the same basin. Productive 
hydroelectric projects were able in this way to carry a number of otherwise 
• 
unjustifiable projects. Ultimately, flood control benefits played a large part in 
project evaluation. Difficult to quantify in the first place, flood control benefits 
did not have to be repaid, making cost recovery easier to realize. 
Also contributing to overinvestment in facilities is the step-wise scaling of 
facilities. Often the choice is to under- or overbuild based on projected needs. 
Given a general growth bias reflected in the decision-making process, the 
tendency typically is to opt for the larger facility. At the water delivery system 
level, the large number of systems exacerbates this problem, resulting in over 
capacity at the system level and a cumulative excess capacity areawide. 
Compounding this problem is the growth bias alluded to above. Optimistic 
chambers of commerce and local officials often project phenomena growth for 
their areas. Betting on the outcome, communities frequently build excess 
capacity, not wanting to lose potential industrial prospects or overestimating the 
locational advantages of water and sewer capacity relative to other locational 
deficiencies. More often than not in these circumstances, communities are saddled 
with excessive debt burden and less than expected repayment capacity. 
Lastly, perhaps the most important factor contributing to overinvestment in 
facilities is the issue of who is paying for the project. When project beneficiaries 
pay less than the full cost, incentives sway toward overinvestment. Local 
interests are less likely to be cost-conscious when the federal government picks 
up the majority of the tab. At the federal level, no other appropriation category 
has been as susceptible to logrolling as water projects. 
It can be argued rationally that some justification exists for investment in 
water projects on the basis of economic development and flood control benefits or 
for water treatment projects on the basis of public health benefits, all of which 
may accrue beyond local boundaries. Furthermore, access to capital may be 
necessary to allow projects to be built in the first place. Yet, the process seems 
somehow out of synct; projects are too often justified on a political, rather than 
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an economic basis. Retrospective benefit/cost ratios too often fall short when 
large-scale water projects are subjected to critical evaluation. 
Underinvestment in Water Facilities 
At the same time that overinvestment in facilities is occurring, a variety of 
factors are contributing to an underinvestment in water facilities. Among the 
factors pulling in the opposite direction is the financing of facilities through 
appropriations. By subjecting project budgets to annual appropriations, projects 
invariably come on line too late, are in some cases undersized or otherwise 
• 
compromised, or are susceptible to possible diversion of funds. 
Unpredictable institutional behavior runs beyond the issue of annual 
appropriations. The present uncertainty of federal grant programs has slowed 
considerably water infrastructure investment. This uncertainty affects federal 
cost sharing arrangements (PL99-662) as well as federal grant programs. 
Project delays with bonded indebtedness often result in costs to local 
participants. With the Central Arizona Project, incentive clauses were attached 
to alleviate the tie-up of local funds. These incentives in turn, imposed an 
opportunity cost on the U.S. Treasury. Because there is a cost associated with 
uncertainty, the greater the degree of uncertainty, the more likely it is that 
suboptimal allocation decisions are made. 
Although some of the positive spillover effects of projects may be 
incorporated into the decision-making process, negative spillover effects often 
have not been included. This point has been made dramatically in the case of the 
Kesterson Wildlife Refuge where environmental effects of the Central Valley 
Project in California were not fully conceived nor compensated. Drainage systems 
to remove salt accumulation from irrigation projects and oxygen injection 
systems for resevoirs, added later but not included in the original project design, 
have become more common. A critical shortcoming of water resource development 
efforts is that projects often have been underdesigned from an environmental 
systems perspective. 
At the local level, inadequate fiscal capacity has been a significant problem 
for many communities. Among the factors most responsible for this situation are 
low user charges for water and sewer service often caused by political pressure 
and limited bonding potential particularly among small communities. The result 
may be that the community is forced to maintain undersized and/or outdated 
facilities. 
8 
A final point that may influence investment in water facilities in the future, 
although the outcomes are uncertain at this time, is the impact of federal tax 
reform. At the present time, it appears that the new law may restrict multiple 
use projects. Yet, it may help traditional water supply. 
Underinvestment in Operation, Maintenance and Repair 
Investment in operation, maintenance and repair (OM&R) is influenced by 
decisions made with respect to new facilities. Perhaps most important in this 
respect is the goldplated facilities syndrome referred to above. Highly engineered 
facilities entail expensive maintenance requirements. Yet, subsidies and low 
interest loans typically are earmarked for new facilities at the expense of OM&R, 
new facilities being more impressive than comparatively mundane maintenance 
and repair activity. As a result, financial incentives discourage OM&R 
expenditures allowing existing facilities to deteriorate while available funds are 
targeted for new construction. 
A second factor at work is the out-of-sight-out-of-mind management style 
that characterizes water and sewer infrastructure. Psychologically, it seems 
easier to forego maintenance and repair work with equipment that is not 
visible--underground pipes being the extreme case. Tight maintenance budgets 
and the hidden nature of the system reinforce a "don't-fix-it-if-it-ain't-broke" 
way of doing business. The tendency then is to wait until something breaks before 
repairs are done, rather than to practice preventive maintenance. 
Finally, OM&R activities fall victim to the whims of the political business 
cycle. Where infrastructure appropriations are made in a political setting those 
decisions are subject to the most relevant time horizons for elected officials, i.e., 
election periods of two, four, or six years. Project dedications generate a great 
deal more political capital back home than do OM&R appropriations. As such, 
short-term political payoffs are inconsistent with long-run efficiencies in 
capital facilities planning. 
The end result of this situation is that water and sewer infrastructure in 
many U.S. cities is badly in need of repair, renovation, and replacement. It is 
estimated that the cost of repairing America's deteriorating water and sewer 
infrastrucure will be close to $200 billion by the year 2000.4 Costs continue to 
escalate so that further delays will bring still higher costs in the future. It is 
imperative, therefore, that creative ways to maintain this aging infrastructure be 
developed before still further deterioration occurs. 
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OPTIONS FOR FINANCING WATER RESOURCE INFRASTRUCTURE 
The paradox of over/underinvestment in water resource infrasructure has 
become serious with deteriorating facilities and insufficient capacity on the one 
hand and over capacity on the other hand. If this distortion is to be addressed, 
fundamental institutional changes will be required in the way that capital 
markets operate for water resource investments. The following chapter will try 
to sketch guidelines for doing so. 
THE POLICY FRAMEWORK 
It would be naive to ignore the fact that water resource allocations are made 
in the political arena where projects are often evaluated in terms of political, 
rather than financial, capital. As such, a quite different scrutiny is applied. 
Still, it can be argued that, for good or bad, this system allowed for the 
application of collective resources: to develop engineering marvels of the modern 
world, to open the West, and to tame many of the continent's great rivers. 
Yet, the rules of the game may have changed. Significant federal deficits that 
have surfaced over the past decade are forcing a more critical review of federal 
expenditures. As noted earlier, real federal expenditures for natural resource 
programs peaked in 1965, while nominal expenditures peaked in 1980. Since 
that time, water development expenditures have fallen, and it seems unlikely that 
significantly larger shares of the federal budget will be diverted, save a national 
catastrophe. 
In addition, as with any resource development endeavor, the best projects 
have been developed first as a rule. Changing demand and technology may 
influence the relative ranking of projects, but from an engineering and hydrologic 
standpoint at time of construction, the best projects are behind us. The projects 
that remain for future development generally will entail less favorable physical 
attributes, higher costs of delivery, lower benefit streams, or some combination 
of these characteristics relative to earlier projects. In a slightly different way, 
the same analogy holds for water quality projects as incremental pollution control 
projects become exponentially more costly. 
If future water projects are to be cost effective, a different litmus test will 
need to be developed to evaluate the financial viability of proposed projects. 
Greater emphasis will need to be placed on full cost pricing of water resources and 
on the appropriation of project costs to more closely match project benefits. 
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Multiple Purpose Projects 
Water resource projects are rarely one-dimensional. Instead, projects 
often involve some combination of benefits including, but not limited to, flood 
control, irrigation, hydropower, navigation, and municipal and industrial water 
supply. The appropriation of project benefits among water uses is difficult but 
necessary if resources are to be allocated effectively. Benefit-cost techniques 
evolved specifically to provide a more objective means of evaluating water 
resource projects. 
Yet, despite this methodological framework, the decision-making process 
remains less than rational. In actuality, the calculus of water resource finance is 
less precise than its outward rigor and air of objectivity might suggest. Some 
project benefits are less tangible than others and thereby more susceptible to 
interpretation and honest debate among those of different philosophical leanings. 
The intangible nature of many project benefits allows for significant latitude in 
the allocation of benefit streams and creativity in terms of cost recovery schemes. 
Central to this issue is the question of who actually pays for the project. 
Beneficiary Pay Principle 
The beneficiary pay principle is premised on the assertion that costs are 
most appropriately borne by beneficaries. This principle is consistent in 
concept with highest and best use conditions where resources are allocated to 
activities offering the highest return. As costs are borne by beneficiaries, 
resources are committed only in cases where benefits are equal to or exceed 
costs. Where tangible benefits accrue, such as in the case of water supply and 
hydro projects, full cost recovery should be apportioned to project beneficiaries. 
Such benefits are consistent with market processes where individual users pay 
appropriate shares of project costs and make individual decisions as to their level 
of use. 
Failure to capture full project costs leads ultimately to overutilization of 
the resource and, in terms of project planning, to overcapitalization of 
infrastructure. As such, full cost pricing is a critical element of water finance 
guidelines. Likewise, cost deferral to other project uses, especially where those 
costs are not recoverable, or pricing based upon less than the true opportunity 
cost of capital are likely to lead to unabated demand. Where subsidization results 
in hidden costs, resource allocations are more apt to be suboptimal. 
Demand for subsidized irrigation water and hydropower remain high, while 
the lack of funding for maintenance and repair of municipal water lines 
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discourages their upkeep. No cost recovery provisions encourage flood control 
projects while effects on downstream users go unaccounted. Important here is the 
proration of public and private benefits allocating private benefits to appropriate 
user groups and public benefits collectively among local beneficiaries and the 
larger national interest with respect to water resources. 
Water Resource Development 
In general, water resource development activities are more tangible and 
• 
therefore more amenable to market forces than are water quality projects. Water 
supply and hydro delivery are typically metered, and compelling efficiency 
concerns argue for full cost recovery. In this context, cost recovery should be 
based on the opportunity cost of capital reflecting market interest rates and, 
particu I a r I y du r i n g inf I at io nary ti m es, v a I u ing capita I assets at cu r re n t or 
replacement costs rather than at original purchase price. 
Applying these yardsticks, most of the water development projects currently 
on the books are significantly undervalued. An immediate shift to full cost 
financing would send shock waves through water markets. This distortion effect, 
falling hardest on those that invested significant amounts of capital with the 
expectation of predetermined water rates, suggests that any change that may occur 
be done so gradually. These changes should be reflected in new projects or 
reauthorizations or phased in over an extended time period. 
The other principal water development activities, flood control and 
navigation, are less able to isolate beneficiaries than are water supply and 
hydropower. In the case of flood control, localized benefits should be apportioned 
to assure local commitment and to assist with cost recovery. Ultimately, 
however, the solution is not to build in flood hazard areas or to let developers bear 
flood control costs where flood hazards can or should be anticipated. Existing 
development should be subjected to stringent benefit-cost analysis with relocation 
considered as an option before new projects are begun. 
With navigation, it remains difficult to isolate economic development 
benefits for cost recovery purposes. Still, a greater reliance on user fees and 
local cost sharing seem likely with a favorable long-run effect from an efficiency 
standpoint. 
One of the most promising philosophic shifts in this direction was the 
passage of the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 alluded to above. 
Although the legislation is project specific, it may reflect a new approach toward 
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the authorization of federal projects with stricter project guidelines and more 
significant local cost-sharing provisions. 
Water Quality 
Water quality issues do not conform well to political boundaries and are, 
therefore, more difficult than water development projects to apportion. In that 
sense, there is an active role for government beyond the local level to assure 
water quality with technical assistance as well as subsidies and/or penalties. To 
the extent possible, internalization of negative impacts on water quality should be 
pursued through monitoring and charges on polluters. 
Significant expansion, upgrading, and new construction of waste treatment 
facilities, for which access to capital markets will be necessary, will be required 
between now and the end of the century. The Clean Air Act of 1987 represents an 
important financial policy statement in this regard. By setting up revolving loan 
pools in each of the states, the federal government is forcing a greater state 
presence. This delegation of responsibility does not assume necessarily that states 
will be above political pressure in enacting their programs, but it acknowledges 
the need for greater state and local decision-making involvement. Perhaps even 
more importantly, the transition from a grant to a loan pool program will help to 
prioritize viable projects. Of critical concern will be the interest rates and loan 
guidelines to be established by states which will help to determine the long-term 
stability of state programs. 
Related to water quality issues in some respects are environmental impacts 
of water development projects. Like water quality concerns, environmental 
spillovers must be assessed and accounted for as a project cost . At t imes, 
environmental impacts have been ignored and at other times not fully 
comprehended at the time of construction. Reduced oxygen levels, resevoir silta­
tion, and sodium deposits in irrigated soils have and/or will result in significant 
costs. Although O&M funds exist to deal with such issues, it seems likely that 
those reserves may be seriously underfunded for some of these long-term costs. 
No provision exists for such catastrophic effects as the environmental damage 
inflicted at Kesterson. Cost recovery provisions should be dynamic to allow 
undervalued or unanticipated spillover effects to be absorbed as a project cost. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Capital markets for water resource infrastructure often are out of synct. To 
better balance the commitment of financial resources in terms of water 
infrastructure, reassessment of these markets is necessary. In particular, the 
process will require the adherence to sound financial principles if outcomes are to 
be more optimal. Guidelines for promoting more effective resources allocations 
in terms of over- and underinvestment in water-related infrastructure are 
suggested below. 
Overinvestment in Infrastructure 
- Water infrastructure should be subject to full cost financing. Hidden 
costs invariably lead to to overinvestment in capital facilities. 
- Costs should be borne by project beneficiaries and prorated among 
private and public interests. Subsidization should be employed only 
where public benefits exist and are not recoverable through private user 
fees. 
- Higher cost sharing for public aspects of water projects should be borne 
by local entities as most benefits can be localized and to assure resource 
commitments only for financially sound projects. 
- O&M and environmental effects should be included as project costs with 
adjustments made over the project life where funds are insufficient to 
meet project induced costs. 
- Funding criteria must be rational and strictly adhered to if projects are 
to be prioritized on sound financial principles. 
Underinvestment in Infrastructure 
- Project costs should not be subject to annual appropriations that may 
alter project design after authorization and in turn lead to 
underinvestment in facilities. 
- Public health and environmental side effect costs are often 
underappropriated. , These effects should be absorbed by project 
beneficiaries. 
- Private user fees are often too low relative to maintenance and 
replacement of capital stock. Depreciation funds should reflect current 
value of plant and equipment. 




- The institutional environment must be predictable. Uncertainty bears a 
cost in capital markets and often leads to suboptimal outcomes. 
- Regionalization of water facilities beyond political boundaries should be 
encouraged to account for economies-of-scale and to decrease the 
cumulative effect of the over/undercapitalization problem. 
- Access to capital markets must be provided with capital costs reflecting 
true market rates. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1William H. Lee, "Estimating New York Water Supply Needs," Engineering 
Foundation Conference on Financial and Amortizing Water Resource 
Infrastructure at Palm Coast, Florida, March 29 - April 3, 1987. 
2The cost to upgrade water delivery systems has been estimated at $3.7 
billion/year by the Joint Economic Committee, $4.4 billion/year by the 
American Water Works Association and $5.9 to $7.6 billion/year by the 
Congressional Budget Office. Figures compiled from the National Council on 
Public Works Improvement, Report to the President and Congress, 1986. 
3Office of Municipal Pollution Control, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Current estimates on costs to meet clean water standards. 
4A compilation of annual costs for water delivery systems and EPA estimates 
for waste treatment facilities from footnotes 2 and 3 above. Figures are in 
constant dollars. 
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